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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

of the recall letters outweighs any possible prejudice" which might
be occasioned by their receipt in evidence. 56 Because the trial court
had not attempted to dispell this prejudice via careful jury instructions, however, the cause was remanded for a retrial. '
It is submitted that the result reached in Barry is both desirable
and just. The postoccurrence repair doctrine recently has been
sharply attacked by a commentator who maintained that it deprives
many deserving litigants of relevant and often crucial evidence.258
Courts of some jurisdictions, perhaps in recognition of this severe
effect of the rule, have refused to apply it in products liability actions. 9 Beyond its adverse impact on the truth-seeking process, the
doctrine's principal justification may be unfounded; no empirical
data exists to substantiate the claim that admission of subsequent
repair evidence would discourage reparative measures. 20 By refusing to extend the rule, the Barry court has ensured that a jury in a
products liability action will not be unreasonably "deprived of a
complete picture" of the case's factual setting.2 1 Hopefully, Barry
is the first step towards the elimination of the harsh subsequent
26 2
repairs doctrine from New York's law of evidence.
Sale of cooperative stock held subject to real property statute of
frauds.
An individual purchasing shares of stock in a cooperative housing corporation receives a proprietary lease entitling him to occupy
an apartment in a housing complex.2 3 The combination of stock and
238

55 App. Div. 2d at 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 876. Additionally, the court, taking judicial

notice of the millions of recall letters already issued by car manufacturers, reasoned that if
the letters were not admitted, the jurors "might well . . . believe that no such letters were
issued and that the claimed defect was a solitary one and did not in fact exist." Id. at 11,
389 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
" The trial court's failure to properly charge the jury prompted the appellate division
to order a new trial. The charge was prejudicial, the court held, because it was not made clear
to the jurors that the letters were not admissions that the vehicle involved in the case was
defective. Id.
-1 See Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule in Need of
Repair, 7 THE FORUM 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
211See, e.g., Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959);
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976).
23 Schwartz, supra note 258, at 6.
"I Id. at 7.
282Apparently, other New York courts have reached the same conclusion as the Barry
court. See Murphy v. General Motors Corp., 55 App. Div. 2d 486, 391 N.Y.S.2d 24 (3d Dep't
1977), wherein the appellate division observed, without comment, that the trial court had
admitted a recall letter into evidence.
22 See 2 P. ROHAN & R. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.02(5)(e)
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leasehold interests which the purchaser acquires creates difficulties
for those attempting to define the nature of the interest possessed
by the tenant-stockholder.2 64 Recently, in Sebel v. Williams, 6 ' the
Civil Court, Queens County, held that the sale of cooperative stock
involves the transfer of an interest in real property and that the real
property statute of frauds 261 thus requires such a transaction to be
in writing." 7
In Sebel, defendants entered into an oral contract to purchase
shares of stock in a housing cooperative and the accompanying proprietary lease which was allocated to that stock.2 8 Defendants failed
to purchase the stock, however, and plaintiffs instituted an action
for breach of contract.2 6 9 Contending that the cooperative stock and
lease consistently have been held to be personal property, 270 plaintiffs asserted that the sale did not represent the exchange of an
interest in real estate. Arguing, therefore, that the statute of frauds
was not applicable to the sale, plaintiffs maintained that the oral
agreement was enforceable notwithstanding the absence of a written
contract.2'
While agreeing with plaintiffs' argument that the stock and
lease were personal property, the transfer of which did not constitute a sale of an interest in real estate, the Sebet court nevertheless
(1977). Normally, in lieu of a fixed rental, a monthly service charge covering the tenant's
proportionate share of the expenses of the cooperative is assessed. The amount of the assessment is usually based upon the percentage of shares owned by the cooperator. See Isaacs,
History and Development of the Co-operative Apartment, PRAc. LAW, Nov. 1959, 62, 66.
264 See Note, Legal Characterizationof the Individual'sInterest in a CooperativeApartment: Realty or Personalty? 73 COLUM. L. REv. 250 (1973).
"1 88 Misc. 2d 411, 388 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1976).
2,1 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-703(2) (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1976-1977) provides: "A
contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any real property,
or an interest therein, is void unless the contract . . . is in writing ...
"
"1 88 Misc. 2d at 414, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
264 Id. at 411-12, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
264 Id. at 412, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
I" Id. at 413, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 495. In support of their contention that the sale of cooperative stock and the accompanying lease constituted the sale of personal property, plaintiffs
cited Silverman v. Alcoa Plaza Assocs., 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep't 1971),
and State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 84 Misc. 2d 161, 378 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1975), af'd per curiam, 53 App. Div. 2d 814, 385 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1st Dep't 1976). In Silverman,
the appellate division determined that cooperative stock qualifies as a "good," the sale of
which is governed by article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 37 App. Div. 2d at 172, 323
N.Y.S.2d at 45. Subsequently, in Shor, the Supreme Court, New York County, in the course
of determining lien priorities, concluded that cooperative stock is personal property. 84 Misc.
2d at 164, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
21 88 Misc. 2d at 413, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
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decided that the transaction was subject to the provisions of the
statute of frauds.7 2 The court pointed out that the statute of frauds
covers the exchange of interests in real property, 27 3 which include
some items that are "chattels real or personal property. ' 27 4 Thus,

contracts involving personal property may be subject to the statute's provisions. Pursuant to this analysis, Judge Posner concluded
2 75
that the statute indeed applies to the cooperative contract.
The Sebel court, faced with a line of decisions apparently hold276
ing the sale of cooperative stock to be a sale of personal property,
engaged in a lengthy exercise to conclude that the sale nevertheless
constituted the transfer of "an interest" in real property and was
subject to the statute of frauds. Rather than struggle to characterize
the cooperator's interest as an interest in real property, however, it
is suggested that the better approach would be the one employed
by the supreme court in Frank v. Rubin,2 77 which is apparently the

sole previous case to deal with the applicability of the statute of
frauds to the sale of cooperative stock. In Frank, while the conclusion reached was essentially identical to that attained in Sebel, the
decision was predicated upon the assumption that the purchaser's
primary motivation was to obtain a lease.2 8 Since the lease was for

a period exceeding 1 year, the transaction was subject to the statute
of frauds.29 The Frank approach thus avoids the complex reasoning
V2

Id.

21 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-703(2) (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1976-1977), quoted in note
266 supra.
21 88 Misc. 2d at 414, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 495. "As used in section 5-703

. .

.the terms

'estate' and 'interest in real property' include every such estate and interest, freehold or
chattel, legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §
5-101(2) (McKinney 1964) (emphasis added).
"1 88 Misc. 2d at 414, 388 N.Y.S.2d at 496.
27 See Susskind v. 1136 Tenants Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 588, 591, 251 N.Y.S.2d 321, 326
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1964); note 270 supra. It has been held that cooperative
apartments constitute personalty for estate purposes and do not pass under a general devise
of real property. See In re Turner's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 684, 685, 233 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (Sur.
Ct. N.Y. County 1962); In re Estate of Schlesinger, 22 Misc. 2d 810, 811-13, 194 N.Y.S.2d
710, 713-14 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1959); In re Miller's Estate, 205 Misc. 770, 772, 130
N.Y.S.2d 295, 296 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1954). For purposes of determining lien priorities,
however, the courts have taken varying approaches. Compare State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 84
Misc. 2d 161, 165, 378 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), aff'd per curiam, 53
App. Div. 2d 814, 385 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1st Dep't 1976) (for purposes of determining lien priorities, the cooperator's interest constitutes personal property), with Lacaille v. Feldman, 44
Misc. 2d 370, 386, 253 N.Y.S.2d 937, 954 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964) (proprietary lease is
not personal property, but is in the nature of a quasi-real property interest).
2?759 Misc. 2d 796, 300 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969).
21RId. at 797, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
21 Id. A lessee's interest historically has been held to constitute personal property; today,
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engaged in by the Sebel court; under the Frank rationale, the statute of frauds may govern the cooperative situation just as it controls
ordinary leasehold interests.
Notwithstanding the court's questionable reasoning, it is suggested that the Sebel result is reasonable and desirable. Clearly, the
cooperator possesses, at a minimum, the leasehold interest; in fact,
the corporate form of organization enables the cooperator to exercise
rights beyond those enjoyed by an ordinary lessee. 8 ' It would be
anomalous, therefore, to conclude that a lessee for a period exceeding 1 year falls within the statute of frauds, while a cooperator
exercising greater rights in an apartment is not subject to the statute's provisions. Thus, it is submitted that the Sebel court rendered
a fair and proper decision.
however, statutory developments have altered this basic principle. See 2 R. POWELL, LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 221(2), at 187 (rev. ed. 1977). Thus the lease for a period exceeding 1 year
has been treated as realty for statute of fraud purposes. Id.
2 It has been stated that "while the owner of a cooperative apartment does not acquire
a fee in the apartment, he does possess so many of the rights and obligations peculiar to fee
ownership that the status is for all practical purposes indistinguishable." Silverman v. Alcoa
Plaza Assocs., 37 App. Div. 2d 166, 173, 323 N.Y.S.2d 39, 46 (1st Dep't 1971) (Steuer and
Eager, JJ., dissenting). Pursuant to I.R.C. § 216(a), the cooperator receives a tax benefit not
enjoyed by an ordinary tenant. The amount of the cooperator's yearly payments which are
attributable to the corporate debt incurred in acquiring and maintaining the land and building may be deducted from gross income. In addition, there are other benefits and rights
unique to cooperative ownership. See, e.g., Whitebook, The Cooperative Apartment, PRAC.
LAW., April 1963, 25, 30-31.

